This paper examines two puzzles of indeterminacy. The first puzzle concerns the hypothesis that there is a unified phenomenon of indeterminacy. How are we to reconcile this with the apparent diversity of reactions that indeterminacy prompts? The second puzzle focuses narrowly on borderline cases of vague predicates. How are we to account for the lack of theoretical consensus about what the proper reaction to borderline cases is? I suggest (building on work by Maudlin) that the characteristic feature of indeterminacy is (...) alethic normative silence, and use this to explain both plurality and lack of consensus. (shrink)

In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inference-patterns (...) such as reductio and conditional proof. (shrink)

David Wallace has recently argued that the eigenstate–eigenvalue (E–E) link has no place in serious discussions of quantum mechanics on the grounds that, as he claims, the E–E link is an invention of philosophers rather than the community of practicing physicists. This raises an historical question regarding the origin of the link. This paper aims to answer this question by tracing the historical development of the link through six key textbooks of quantum mechanics. In light of the historical evidence from (...) these textbooks, it is argued that Wallace provides insufficient grounds for dismissing the E–E link from discussions of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This paper outlines Lewis’s favoured foundational account of linguistic representation, and outlines and briefly evaluates variations and modifications. Section 1 gives an opinionated exegesis of Lewis’ work on the foundations of reference—his interpretationism. I look at the way that the metaphysical distinction between natural and non-natural properties came to play a central role in his thinking about language. Lewis’s own deployment of this notion has implausible commitments, so in section 2 I consider variations and alternatives. Section 3 briefly considers a (...) buck-passing strategy involving fine-grained linguistic conventions. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

*This work is no longer under development* Two major themes in the literature on indicative conditionals are that the content of indicative conditionals typically depends on what is known;1 that conditionals are intimately related to conditional probabilities.2 In possible world semantics for counterfactual conditionals, a standard assumption is that conditionals whose antecedents are metaphysically impossible are vacuously true.3 This aspect has recently been brought to the fore, and defended by Tim Williamson, who uses it in to characterize alethic necessity by (...) exploiting such equivalences as: A⇔¬A A. One might wish to postulate an analogous connection for indicative conditionals, with indicatives whose antecedents are epistemically impossible being vacuously true: and indeed, the modal account of indicative conditionals of Brian Weatherson has exactly this feature.4 This allows one to characterize an epistemic modal by the equivalence A⇔¬A→A. For simplicity, in what follows we write A as KA and think of it as expressing that subject S knows that A.5 The connection to probability has received much attention. Stalnaker suggested, as a way of articulating the ‘Ramsey Test’, the following very general schema for indicative conditionals relative to some probability function P: P = P 1For example, Nolan ; Weatherson ; Gillies. 2For example Stalnaker ; McGee ; Adams. 3Lewis. See Nolan for criticism. 4‘epistemically possible’ here means incompatible with what is known. 5This idea was suggested to me in conversation by John Hawthorne. I do not know of it being explored in print. The plausibility of this characterization will depend on the exact sense of ‘epistemically possible’ in play—if it is compatibility with what a single subject knows, then can be read ‘the relevant subject knows that p’. If it is more delicately formulated, we might be able to read as the epistemic modal ‘must’. (shrink)

The text of lines 39–40 is open to three main objections: stimulantem pectu Achilli cannot be construed in its context; to refer tuas to Persen would involvi difficult, though not unexampled, change of person; and thirdly, and most serious, it is scarcely possible to believe that Cornelia could appeal to a king of Macedon to testify to the soundness of her morals.

Father Lonergan, Professor at the Gregorian University in Rome, writes from the conviction that by thoroughly understanding what it is to understand, one will understand the structure of all that is and can be understood. Focussing on insight, the very essence of understanding, Father Lonergan examines illustrations of insight in mathematics, science, common sense, etc., in order to bring the reader to an insight into insight. The sometimes annoyingly prolix discussion is intended to enable the reader to grasp within his (...) own self-consciousness the structure or invariant pattern of all understanding. The advance from lower to higher standpoints of understanding is traced, and a plurality of patterns appropriate to diverse domains, each standpoint of insight exhibiting a structure of understanding correlative to an intelligibility immanent in its subject matter, is acknowledged. Yet Father Lonergan pursues insight until at last he claims to discover the unifying, universal, invariant pattern and hence the ultimate metaphysical intelligibility. This structure or pattern proves to be essentially scholastic in conception, in particular Thomistic; yet the scholasticism Father Lonergan advances contains important revisions in matters of method and content. A carefully argued book, Insight is a remarkable combination of orthodoxy and originality.--A. J. R. (shrink)

Elders' work is patterned after Ross's editions of Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and Analytics, except that Elders does not include the Greek text to accompany his commentary. Each chapter of the four books of De Caelo is briefly summarized and a line by line commentary ensues with special consideration given to the more controversial passages. In an introduction to his commentary, Elders develops the essential themes surrounding Aristotle's cosmology: 1) The proper historical setting, 2) The notion of natural movement and elementary (...) bodies, 3) The role of metaphysics in Aristotle's cosmology, Aristotle's notion of science and methodology. Elders seems to gloss over the main problem that Aristotle's Cosmology engenders, viz., whether the heavenly spheres move by a natural necessity or are moved by a supra-celestial principle. His comment on the first chapter of Book III points out Aristotle's intention of including both the heavens and the sub-lunar sphere under the study of Physics. He correctly points out that if one is to understand the De Caelo, then one must "look upon cosmology the way its author did, viz., as a science of intellectual vision, rather than as a labor of toilsome research: the study of the cosmos is an intellectual effort which finds its end and its reward in itself."—J. J. R. (shrink)

This edition of Aristotelian scholarship contains the proceedings of the third Symposium Aristotelicum. Choosing to discuss one work of Aristotle, the Topics, the participants were thus able to center their discussions around Aristotle's notion of dialectics. Owen has arranged the papers into interesting categories, some of which contain critical analyses of the text. There is also a valuable index of sources. One especially interesting chapter deals with the question of the relationship between Aristotelian thought and Platonic thought. Under the specific (...) scrutiny of the Symposium, the question is: to what extent do the dialectics of Aristotle rely upon Plato's theory of Forms and the method of diaeresis that leads up to the Forms? Friedrich Solmsen, the most emphatic of all the writers on this point, claims that the dialectics of the Topics ignore any ontological reference. According to Solmsen, Aristotle accepted the logical structure of Plato's dialectic and diaeresis but then prescinded from any commitment to the Forms. C. J. De Vogel agrees with Solmsen insofar as Aristotle begins to see the theory of Forms as "problematic" due to the immaturity of Aristotle's own theory. De Vogel cites several passages that would seem to counter the position of Solmsen. For example, in defining "justice" as a virtue, Aristotle prefers the abstract term δικαιοσύνη as properly falling under the category ἀγαθόν, rather than the concrete δίκαιον. In a paper by Gilbert Ryle it is claimed that Aristotle never formally learned dialectical philosophy at Plato's academy, so that questions of how and why Aristotle broke from his master are unreal. Ryle suggests that the second part of Plato's Parmenides was written to exemplify the categories of the Topics and to school the more advanced students in the art of dialectics which was not taught to those under thirty years of age. How much Aristotle's dialectical philosophy is indebted to Plato is still a debatable point; but it is debated very well in these papers.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Almost every aspect of Aristotle's philosophy is touched upon in this book. Part One deals with the intellectual development of Aristotle and repeats Jaeger's claim that Aristotle's thought was a continual process of development and not a static system of concepts. The "First Athenian Period" finds Aristotle as Plato's pupil. The "Period of Travel" embraces the formulation of his theory of causes and substance. The "Second Athenian Period" includes the work at the Lyceum and its contribution to systematic investigation. In (...) this First Part, Lloyd suggests that the greatest enigma surrounding the development of Aristotle's thought is the latter's relation with Plato's philosophy. Lloyd sees Aristotle as more than "Plato's pupil." He sees Aristotle in reaction to Plato; inasmuch as the former rejects the notion of Forms as central to philosophy, introduces the principle of potentiality as an explanation of change, and distinguishes "substance" in a primary sense which gives concrete ground to reality. Yet, while Aristotle is critical of Platonism, certain Platonic notions are retained, e.g., that intelligibility is gained only through universals; that the basic world-view is teleological. The Second Part of the book is concerned with the fundamentals of Aristotle's thought, in which all of the highlights of his thought are outlined and commented upon. Logic, metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics, poetics, politics--all are given a brief but accurate analysis. The author does not claim to write this book for the Aristotelian scholar; rather, it is directed toward the undergraduate or other interested reader who may want more knowledge of the philosopher from Stagira.--J. J. R. (shrink)

In 1951 Lukasiewicz [[sic]] linked Aristotle's Prior Analytics with modern formal logic. This book attempts to analyze Aristotle's syllogistic theory in the light of Lukasiewcz's work and the whole tradition of classic interpretations of Aristotle's logic. The first of the book's five chapters shows that for Aristotle the syllogism is basically a relationship of terms couched in conditional form; a relationship of variables rather than concrete terms; and a relationship that sees S linked with P not by the copula but (...) by less metaphysical expressions. The classical S is P form is not Aristotelian at all but a much later renovation. The second chapter maintains that Aristotle distinguishes "relative necessity" from "absolute necessity." Aristotle himself ignores his own distinction at times and thus creates logical difficulties for himself. The oft-fought sea battle is fought again in this chapter. Chapter three deals with the controversial notions of "perfect" and "imperfect" syllogisms. The author asserts that by "perfect syllogism" Aristotle means self-evident syllogisms that serve as axioms for deducing other proofs. Chapters four and five deal with the figures of the syllogism and the syllogism as a deductive system respectively. Patzig concludes that Aristotle's syllogistic theory is purely formal in its structure and can only be properly understood if it is not tied to a metaphysics and converted into a philosophical logic. He denies that it is a universal logic, but rather sees it as a specialized theory of relations.--J. J. R. (shrink)

This third and final volume of the collected papers of the late Alfred Schutz contains for the most part the author's evaluation of later Husserlian thought. As in the first and second volumes, Schutz attempts to show the relevance of phenomenology to social experiences. All the papers in this volume were originally published between 1953-1958, except that in which Schutz compares James' "stream of thought" with Husserl's "stream of consciousness." The sequence of papers that follow the James article is: "Husserl's (...) Ideals, Vol. II," in which Schutz describes Husserl's attempt at a phenomenological analysis of the constitution of nature, beginning with inanimate objects, proceeding to "nature in a second and enlarged sense", and concluding with the region of Geist. "Husserl's Ideas, Vol. III": a brief paper analyzing the Husserlian ambition of a phenomenology which affords a fundamental method of grounding all knowledge. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," in which Schutz pinpoints the problem well: since it is impossible to experience another person's original mental content, how can "another psychophysical ego be constituted in my ego?" How can solipsism be avoided? How can phenomenology be applied to the social sciences? Schutz concludes that with his notion of "pairing" in his Cartesian Meditations Husserl does not succeed in constituting a transcendental intersubjectivity through the conscious operations of a transcendental ego. "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy": the phenomenological look at the problem of universals. "Some Structures of the Life-World": a consideration of the Lebenswelt with an eye toward establishing the relevance to social sciences. The last two papers deal with the philosophy of Max Scheler.—J. J. R. (shrink)

This volume of selections provides a fresh translation of some of the major philosophical and literary achievements of the beleaguered editor of the Encyclopedie. For the most part, the selections follow a chronological sequence with each selection given a brief explanation in which the reader is referred to the 1875 Assezat and Tourneux edition of Diderot's works. The main thrust of Diderot's philosophical materialism is embodied in D'Alembert's Dream, in which the author argues that the mechanized-physical view gives coherent unity (...) to cosmological, biological, and moral speculation. Yet, if Diderot is to be a materialist, he is to be a humanistic one, for in his Refutation of Helvetius he rails against the latter's view of man as a mere sensory-bound animal devoid of real moral feelings. Thus there is in Diderot a vacillation between a heartfelt desire for moral values which beg to be grounded on reason, and a reason that cannot accept the basis for the values of his day since experience seems to contradict such a basis. Diderot expresses this dichotomy well in Rameau's Nephew. In the mastery of his dialogue form, Diderot plays the man of moral stability while the nephew represents the moral nihilist. It is interesting to note that Hegel saw in the nephew a cultural alienation or self-estrangement which gradually produced the characteristic cleavage between faith and reason in the age of the French Enlightenment. Since he bore this inner tension within himself, and since it is men who make up "ages," one can say that Diderot was the French Enlightenment.—J. J. R. (shrink)

This reconstruction of Empedocles' thought for the most part depends upon how the notions of rest and movement are related to the elements. Many traditional interpretations have both the love and strife forces of Empedocles as moving causes which combine and separate the elements respectively. O'Brien claims, however, that there is really only one moving cause: strife; and therefore there is only one time of rest in the cosmos, when love unites the elements into the Sphere. Strife is seen as (...) Empedocles' explanation of diversity in the world, and love as his explanation of unity. O'Brien's reconstruction, then, would rank Empedocles as a serious metaphysician coping with the problem of the one and the many; rather than as a naive pre-scientist explaining the genesis of animals by the combining of "separated limbs." O'Brien suggests that Empedocles is attempting to save the Parmenidean notion of unity without relegating movement to the realm of illusion. In this way, Empedocles also appears to anticipate Plato's attempt to explain the spatial and temporal world in terms of what is non-spatial and timeless. Roughly speaking, as Plato's Forms are to the physical world, so love and strife are to the elements. O'Brien's reconstruction project is carefully done with a rather thorough analysis of all the sources. Appended to the work is a 61-page bibliography which includes every book and article exclusively on Empedocles written from 1806 to 1965.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Too often the historians of philosophy tend to relegate a philosopher to a meaningless anonymity by rigidly classifying his thought into one particular category. De Vogel feels that this has been done to Pythagoras and the Pythagorean tradition. He claims that because philosophical scholars have relied chiefly on Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of Pythagoras, two misleading effects have ensued: 1. We have lost sight of the man Pythagoras and his charismatic influence on the people of Croton and Magna Graecia; 2. (...) Pythagoras, cosmic theory of numerical ratios has been emphasized to the neglect of, and in separation from, his political and social teachings. De Vogel hopes to remedy these two impressions by returning to "neglected evidence" and reconstructing the life of Pythagoras. He hopes to remove Pythagoras from that vague classification as one of the οἱ φυσικοί into which Aristotle had placed all the pre-Socratic thinkers. Furthermore, the author wants to show the essential unity of Pythagoras' cosmic, social, and political thinking. The neglected evidence on which De Vogel bases his reconstruction is mainly the testimony of Timaeus, an historian of Southern Italy and Sicily; Aristoxenus, a follower of Pythagoras; and Dicaearchus, a writer of cultural history. In addition to these last mentioned sources, the author cites the testimony of coins and quotes leading archaeologists; he refers to the many historians and biographers of Pythagoras; and especially, he draws from the four speeches of Pythagoras that are recorded by Iamblichus. With these source materials, De Vogel reconstructs a Pythagoras who is a charismatic preacher-moralist; one who gives precepts of life governing justice, friendship, love, health, education, rhetoric, and medicine. What is more, all of these social and political teachings are shown to be integrated with the cosmic theory of numbers which De Vogel removes from the realm of abstract and idle theory. Pythagoras emerges as a leading figure in Croton and throughout Magna Graecia. All in all, this volume is an excellent contribution to Pythagorean scholarship.--J. J. R. (shrink)

After describing the three main kinds of probability theories, the author presents a new logical theory of probability. Probability, for him, is a logical relation between bodies of evidence and statements. The theory is an advance over Carnap's logical theory of probability in that it is not based on a formal language with strong completeness properties. The theory is formalized in Quine's protosyntax, which has two disadvantages: first, long formulas couched in terms of a large number of defined symbols disfigure (...) the book and obscure the exposition; and secondly, it is desirable to keep our theories of inductive logic and deductive logic independent. There seems to be no reason to burden one sort of theory with the other. There is no index.--J. R. W. (shrink)

This handy paperback edition offers a new translation of the almost untranslatable style of Pascal. As expected, the greater portion of the book is made up of selections from Pensées. Works classified as "Religious" and "Moral" are also offered, along with one of Pascal's witty and biting Provincial Letters in which Pascal had aligned himself with the Jansenists of Port Royal. Several selections highlight Pascal's pioneering in scientific method—"Treatise on the Vacuum" and "Reflections on Geometry and the Art of Persuading."—J. (...) J. R. (shrink)

J. N. Findlay has selected ten lectures given at the British Academy spanning the years 1921-1962. The lectures include: H. A. Prichard's Duty and Ignorance of Fact in which the author examines the notion of moral obligation; G. E. Moore's Proof of an External World which inaugurated the debate whether or not Moore would endorse an "ordinary language" view of philosophy; and J. L. Austin's Ifs and Cans, which begins by asking "Are cans constitutionally iffy?" Austin, after investigating at great (...) length main clauses that contain "cans" in order to see whether or not such clauses are preceded by if clauses, hopes in the end that there will be someday a science of language which can stand independent of philosophy. Then, such a science will be "kicked upstairs" as it were—rid of philosophy just as physics and mathematics rid themselves of philosophy when graciously "kicked upstairs." K. R. Popper examines the historical significance of Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism in his 1960 lecture Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance. There is no research value in this edition. It contains no bibliography and Findlay's very brief introduction simply offers a capsule paragraph on each lecture. In general, as Findlay states, the lectures serve to "illustrate the strong British penchant... for exact, cautious, logical thinking...."—J. J. R. (shrink)

This is a translation of a tenth century Arabic work that purports to be Aristotelian but is obviously written by one who prefers Plato's philosophy. In fact, the Phaedo is apparently the model after which this dialogue is fashioned. Aristotle is on his deathbed surrounded by his disciples. He periodically sniffs at an apple in his hand in order to sustain his failing breath while urging his followers toward philosophy that will reject this world and lead them to salvation. The (...) Aristotle of The Apple wants at least two points clear: the soul is immortal and the world is not eternal. The book might well be called, "The Recantation of Aristotle." The Apple was introduced to European philosophers in 1235 in Barcelona where it was translated from Arabic to Hebrew. In 1255, a Latin translation was made and it was pretty much accepted as part of the Aristotelian corpus for several centuries. This English translation is part of a series of "Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation." The translator admits that The Apple contributes little to the development of philosophy. From an historical point of view, however, she thinks it is a "semiprecious document." It is interesting to see how concerned certain Moslem, Hebrew, and Christian thinkers were to get Aristotle on God's side.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Some will wonder why this book was ever written, thinking perhaps that there is nothing more to be said about "proofs" for the existence of God. Others of a more traditional inclination might be surprised at some of the conclusions drawn by the author. Kenny carefully scrutinizes the five ways of St. Thomas and concludes that they do not constitute rational proofs for God's existence. Kenny's chief criticism is that the arguments of Aquinas are too closely wedded to a cosmology (...) that cannot stand up under a modern critique. The value of this book rests precisely in its use of contemporary philosophy in evaluating the five ways. Perhaps the author's most serious criticism is directed against the Thomistic concept of esse and the notion of God as ipsum esse subsistens. These metaphysical notions of Aquinas have long been acclaimed as extensions of Aristotelian thought. Kenny, however, claims that they are Platonic in nature and hence subject to the centuries of criticism leveled against Plato's Ideas. Under a logical analysis, the notion of God as ipsum esse subsistens "turns out to be the Platonic Idea of a predicate which is at best uninformative and at worst unintelligible."--J. J. R. (shrink)

Can the humanities survive in an age of science? Yes, if analytic philosophers will only stop picking on traditional philosophy and recognize the latter's proper and legitimate role in society. That role according to Veatch, is one that enables man to grasp the nontechnical meaning of our everyday world where we learn to know and understand the nature of things. Such knowledge serves as the necessary ground for not only our common sense attitudes, but also for establishing values and norms (...) for a moral life. What is more, Veatch contends, this knowledge of man, his nature, and his values is not merely emotive or psychological; rather, it is factual. Using traditional logic as its organon, knowledge of a more humanistic variety can establish itself as factual in spite of analytical claims to the contrary. Thus Veatch proceeds from the general problem of the humanities versus science to the more specific area of the two logics: traditional Aristotelian logic and modern symbolic logic. The former is the proper tool of the humanities, the latter serves the method of the physical sciences. Both logics deal with facts in their respective areas. Traditional logic lays bare the facts that make human life meaningful, while symbolic logic operates with formal structures that make technological progression possible. One logic does not cancel out the other. Veatch prefers to view the two logics as a "both... and" structure rather than as an "either... or" situation. To effect this he launches a counterattack against analytic philosophy's repudiation of traditional logic. He charges certain analysts with committing a fallacy that makes necessities and impossibilities a mere function of our language rules. Veatch, however, sees our rules of language as determined by real necessities in the world. He claims that Wittgenstein's celebrated attack on the doctrine of essences never really denies Aristotle's notion of substance as the formal or intelligible aspect of individual entities. Although his justification of traditional logic as a grammar for discourse in the humanities presupposes certain metaphysical commitments, on the whole his plea for traditional philosophy is persuasive.--J. J. R. (shrink)

A reprint of selected chapters and complete non-technical essays by the former Nobel prize physicist.--J. R.

That space and time should be integrated into a single entity, spacetime, is the great insight of Einstein's special theory of relativity, and leads us to regard spacetime as a fundamental context in which to make sense of the world around us. But it is not the only one. Causality is equally important and at least as far as the special theory goes, it cannot be subsumed under a fundamentally geometrical form of explanation. In fact, the agent of propagation of (...) causal influence is electromagnetic radiation. In this examination, the authors find support for a rationalist approach to physics, never neglecting experimentation, but rejecting a simple empiricist or positivist view of science. (shrink)

XLRI, in association with a few Tata Group companies, established the XLRI-JRD Tata Foundation in Business Ethics in 1991 to mark their long-standing commitment and contribution to business ethics in India. The foundation seeks to address this by publicly affirming the urgent need for ethics in business and the need to bring about a conducive culture in which it can thrive.

“Towards a Theory of Taxation” is a proper theme for an Englishman to take when giving a paper in America. After all it was from the absence of such a theory that the United States derived its existence. The Colonists felt strongly that there should be no taxation without representation, and George III was unable to explain to them convincingly why they should contribute to the cost of their defense. Since that time, understanding has not advanced much. In Britain we (...) still maintain the fiction that taxes are a voluntary gift to the Crown, and taxing statutes are given the Royal Assent with the special formula, “La Reine remercie ses bons sujets, accepte leur benevolence, et ainsi le veult” instead of the simple “La Reine le veult,” and in the United States taxes have regularly been levied on residents of the District of Columbia who until recently had no representation in Congress, and by the State of New York on those who worked but did not reside in the State, and so did not have a vote. Taxes are regularly levied, in America as elsewhere, on those who have no say on whether they should be levied or how they should be spent. I am taxed by the Federal Government on my American earnings and by state governments on my American spending, but I should be hard put to it to make out that it was unjust. Florida is wondering whether to follow California in taxing multinational corporations on their world-wide earnings. (shrink)

In the latter half of the twentieth century, developed countries of the world have made tremendous strides in organ donation and transplantation. However, in this area of medicine, Japan has been slow to follow. Japanese ethics, deeply rooted in religion and tradition, have affected their outlook on life and death. Because the Japanese have only recently started to acknowledge the concept of brain death, transplantation of major organs has been hindered in that country. Currently, there is a dual definition of (...) death in Japan, intended to satisfy both sides of the issue. This interesting paradox, which still stands to be fully resolved, illustrates the contentious conflict between medical ethics and medical progress in Japan. (shrink)